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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION-STANDARD OF
REVIEW-RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS-The United States Supreme
Court held that racial classifications imposed by either federal,
state or local governments must be analyzed by a reviewing
court using a strict scrutiny standard.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
In .1989 Mountain Gravel and Construction Company
("Mountain Gravel") was awarded the prime contract for a
highway construction project in Colorado.' The award was given
by the Central Federal Lands Highway Division, a unit of the
United States Department of Transportation.2 Subsequently,
Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors for the
guardrail portion of the construction project.' Both Adarand
Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand") and Gonzales Construction
Company ("Gonzales") submitted bids.4  Although Adarand
submitted the lowest bid, Mountain Gravel awarded the
guardrail subcontract to Gonzales.' The prime contract awarded
to Mountain Gravel contained a clause that stated that if
Mountain Gravel hired certified small businesses controlled by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals," it would
receive additional compensation.' Gonzales was a certified
1. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995). On Sep-
tember 15, 1989, Mountain Gravel was awarded the prime contract for the West
Dolores Project located in the San Juan National Forest. Brief for Petitioner at 8,
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (No. 93-1841). The highway project was located
approximately 400 miles from Denver in Montezuma and Dolores Counties. Id.
2. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
3. Id.
4. Id. Adarand is a highway construction company based in Colorado Springs,
Colorado that specializes in guardrail work. Id.
5. Id. Mountain Gravel's chief estimator submitted an affidavit stating that
Adarand had submitted the lowest bid. Id.
6. Id. at 2103-04. The clause in Mountain Gravel's contract stated:
Subcontracting. This subsection is supplemented to include a Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise (DBE) Development and Subcontracting Provision as fol-
lows; Monetary compensation is offered for awarding subcontracts to small
business concerns .... A small business concern will be considered a DBE
after it has been certified as such by the U.S. Small Business Administration
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disadvantaged business enterprise ("DBE") and Adarand was
not.7
In August of 1990, Adarand filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado seeking declaratory8
and injunctive relief.' Adarand claimed that the federal
program that induced prime contractors such as Mountain
Gravel to hire subcontractors based on race rather than the
amount of a bid was unconstitutional." Adarand argued that
the incentive clause in the contract violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."
On April 24, 1991, cross motions for summary judgment were
or any State Highway Agency .... The Contractor will be paid an amount
computed as follows: 1. If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10 percent of
the final amount of the approved DBE subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent
of the original contract amount. 2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more
DBE's, 10 percent of the final amount of the approved DBE subcontracts, not
to exceed 2 percent of the original contract amount.
Id.
7. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102-03. The Small Business Act of 1958 states in
pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States that small business concerns, and small
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals, shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to partici-
pate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency . . . The term
small business concern owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals shall mean a business concern-(i) which is at least
51 per centum owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals .... [T]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Na-
tive Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minority individuals.
Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2[8], 72 Stat. 384, 389 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
8. Declaratory relief or judgment is defined as a remedy for which a determi-
nation is made by a court as to the legal rights of the litigant(s). BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 409 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992),
aff'd sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Injunctive relief is generally defined as a judicial
process where the court directs or orders a person to do something or refrain from
doing something either on a permanent basis or until the litigation is resolved.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 243. Adarand claimed that the federal program
encouraged prime contractors to hire DBE's and that the presumption that a subcon-
tractor that was minority controlled qualified as a DBE denied Adarand equal pro-
tection under the law. Id.
11. Id. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that "no person . .. (shall] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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filed." The district court issued an opinion and order denying
Adarand's motion for summary judgment and granting the
Government's motion for summary judgment." Adarand filed
an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit on August 5, 1992.' The court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court, holding that the district court did
not err in relying on past decisions of the United States
Supreme Court when it applied an "intermediate scrutiny"
standard15 as the standard of review."6 Adarand subsequently
filed a petition for writ of certiorari17 and certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court. 8 The issue
before the Court was whether all racial classifications imposed
by either a federal, state or local government should be analyzed
by a reviewing court under a strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny standard. 9
The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering whether
Adarand had standing to sue. ° The Court reasoned that for
Adarand to have standing to sue, it had to demonstrate that the
future use of subcontractor compensation clauses would
constitute an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
"concrete, particularized and actual or imminent.""' The Court
12. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 241. Summary judgment is a procedural device
available when there is no genuine issue of material fact and therefore the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (6th
ed. 1990).
13. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 245.
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacat-
ed, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
15. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1545 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 694 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995)). In order for racial classifications to pass the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review, the classifications must serve important governmental objectives
and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Id.
16. Id. at 1544.
17. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. Certiorari is defined as a writ which is used
to require a lower court to produce a certified record of a particular case tried
therein. BLAicK's LAw DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990). The writ is issued granting
certiorari so that the court issuing the writ may inspect the proceedings and deter-
mine whether there have been any irregularities. Id.
18. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994) (granting certiora-
ri).
19. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. In order for a racial classification to pass
the strict scrutiny standard of review, the classification must be a narrowly tailored
measure or program that furthers compelling governmental interests. Id. at 2113.
Justice O'Connor was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 2111.
20. Id. at 2104. Standing to sue is defined as: "No person is entitled to assail
the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute except as he himself is adversely af-
fected by it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
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applied these requirements and found that Adarand's legally
protected interest was that the use of subcontractor
compensation clauses by the government might deny Adarand
equal protection under the law.2 The Court asserted that by
using racial classifications in the bid award process, the interest
was particularized to AdarandY The Court found that
statistically, Adarand was likely to bid on contracts containing
subcontractor compensation clauses on a yearly basis.24 Thus,
the Court concluded that injury to Adarand was imminent and
that Adarand had standing to sue.25
The Court then focused on the level of scrutiny to be used by
a reviewing court when determining whether racial
classifications imposed by a federal, state or local government
are constitutional.26 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
explained that based upon past decisions of the Court,
"skepticism," "consistency," and "congruence" are three general
propositions that have been established with respect to
governmentally imposed racial classifications.27 First, the Court
asserted that any racial classification imposed by the
government for the purpose of treating persons differently,
whether it be a preference or a contention, should be viewed by
courts with "skepticism."" Next, the Court stated that the
standard of review for race-based classifications must be
"consistent" with the protections afforded to all individuals
under the Equal Protection Component of the Fifth
Amendment.29 Finally, the Court reasoned that there must be
"congruence" when analyzing equal protection, whether it be
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
30
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2104-05. The Court explained that the type of injury alleged by
Adarand was that a discriminatory classification prevented Adarand from competing
on equal footing for subcontracts because of Adarand's non-minority status. Id. at
2105.
24. Id. at 2105.
25. Id. The Court explained that an imminent injury is an injury that is not
so speculative that it may never occur. Id. An imminent injury, the Court continued,
is an injury that has a certainty that it will in fact occur in the near future. Id.
26. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105-11.
27. Id. at 2111.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court reasoned that all racial classifications must be viewed with
consistency under the Fifth Amendment regardless of those burdened or benefitted
by the classification. Id.
30. Id. at 2113 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)). The Court not-
ed that equal protection analysis under the Fifth Amendment is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2112-13.
Vol. 34:403
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The Court further explained that any past decisions rejecting
or undermining any of the three propositions-skepticism,
consistency or congruence-should be overruled." The Court
held that the three propositions taken together logically lead to
the conclusion that an individual, regardless of race, has a right
to demand that any government actor justify racial
classifications which subject the individual to unequal treatment
under the strictest judicial scrutiny." The Court concluded that
a racial classification would withstand strict scrutiny only when
the classification serves a compelling governmental interest and
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." The Court
vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.3'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that there could
never be a compelling governmental interest for racial
discrimination even if the government was trying to right past
wrongs.3 5 Justice Scalia agreed that persons who have suffered
the effects of racial discrimination should be compensated in
some manner.36 However, Justice Scalia argued that "under our
Constitution there can be no such thing as a creditor or a debtor
race."37 Justice Scalia concluded that the program in question,
however unlikely to survive under strict scrutiny, was properly
31. Adarand, 116 S. Ct. at 2113. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that FCC minority ownership policies are constitutional
under an intermediate scrutiny standard), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
32. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111. The Court supported its conclusion by quot-
ing Justice Powell in Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke:
If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifica-
tions based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon his personal rights, rather that the individual only because of
his membership in a particular group, then the constitutional standards may
be applied consistently. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the
particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the
standard of justification will remain constant. This is as it should be, since
those political judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by con-
tending groups within the democratic process. When they touch upon an
individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determina-
tion that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. The Constitution guarantees that right
to every person regardless of his background.
Id. (citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).
33. Id. at 2113.
34. Id. at 2118.
35. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
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remanded.38
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed
his agreement with the Court's holding that strict scrutiny must
be applied to all racial classifications imposed by federal, state
and local governments.39 Furthermore, Justice Thomas asserted
that racial classifications by governments raise a constitutional
question." In addition, Justice Thomas reasoned that when
racial classification programs have been imposed, minorities
suffer by being labeled inferior, and develop dependencies or
attitudes that they should be entitled to preferences.41 Thus,
Justice Thomas concluded that government sponsored racial
discrimination is just as "noxious as discrimination inspired by
malicious prejudice."' Finally, Justice Thomas reasoned that
governments cannot make us equal, but rather "can only
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law."'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens contended that the
majority was correct in its assertion that all cases involving
racial classification should be viewed with "skepticism.""
However, Justice Stevens stated that the majority's propositions
of "consistency" and "congruence" are propositions with which he
cannot agree.' The majority's concept of "consistency," Justice
Stevens argued, would ignore the distinction between a "No
Trespassing" sign and a "Welcome" mat." Justice Stevens
explained that "congruence" should not be the policy of the
Court when reviewing federal race classification programs."7
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id. Justice Thomas stated that racial classifications by the government
undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle. Id.
41. Id.
42. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justice
Ginsburg. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2121. The dissent further argued that "consistency" is an abstract
concept, stating that "there is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a poli-
cy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination." Id. at 2120.
47. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131. The dissent stated that deference should be
given to the federal legislature because it is a larger and more diversified body than
the legislatures of the states. Id. at 2124. To further explain his argument Justice
Stevens quoted James Madison:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass wit-
hin which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their
Vol. 34:403
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for ignoring
precedent.' In his conclusion, Justice Stevens asserted that the
judgment of the court of appeals should have been affirmed.49
In a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Souter, the
majority was criticized for entertaining the question of strict
scrutiny."0 Justice Souter contended that the proper question in
the case was whether the federal agency involved had made
specific findings of racial discrimination that warranted a race-
based remedial program.5' Consequently, Justice Souter
reasoned that the majority's opinion did not change the standard
by which racial classifications are reviewed and that the
standard of review was and should remain strict scrutiny.,
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny as the standard of review for racial classifications
imposed by the federal government is Korematsu v. United
States."3 In Korematsu, the issue before the Court was whether
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, which banned all persons of
Japanese ancestry from a prescribed area of the Pacific Coast,
was constitutional under the Equal Protection Component of the
Fifth Amendment.s The Court held that Korematsu, a
Japanese-American, could be treated differently than non-
plan of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
48. Id. at 2126-30. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(holding that FCC minority ownership policies are constitutional under intermediate
scrutiny), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that the Federal Minority Busi-
ness Enterprise statute is constitutional).
49. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131.
50. Id. (Souter, J. dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer. Id.
51. Id. (citing Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1544).
52. Id. at 2133. Justice Souter argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to
all race-based classifications. Id. However, Justice Souter reasoned that there have
been and will continue to be governmental race-based classifications that are narrow-
ly tailored and serve compelling governmental interests and thus will pass the strict
scrutiny test. Id. at 2132-34.
53. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) (holding that a curfew of Japanese-Americans was constitutional due to the
pressing necessity of national safety).
54. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-21. Exclusion Order No. 34 was one of many
orders authorized by Congress issued after the United States declared war on Japan.
Id. The order directed all persons of Japanese ancestry to leave the area, report to
and remain at a designated assembly center and proceed to a relocation center as
directed by military authorities. Id. at 221.
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Japanese-American citizens due to the pressing public necessity
of a wartime situation.5 The Court reasoned that Congress had
authority under the War Powers Clause of the Constitution to
determine who should and should not remain in an area
threatened by hostile forces.5" In the beginning of its analysis,
the Court noted that racial classifications restricting a single
racial group are "immediately suspect" and therefore courts
must apply a strict scrutiny standard. 7 However, the Court
explained that not all classifications are unconstitutional.58
Therefore, the Court concluded that exclusion of persons of
Japanese ancestry during wartime is constitutional because of
the pressing necessity of national safety and security.59
In Bolling v. Sharpe,6" the Supreme Court considered
whether racial segregation in public schools in the District of
Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.6 The Court held that segregation of African-
American children in public education is not reasonably related
to any governmental objective and violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6' The Court opined that it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution that prohibits
states from maintaining segregated schools would impose a
lesser duty on the federal government." Chief Justice Warren,
delivering the opinion of the Court, reasoned that racial
classifications must be scrutinized with care because they are
fundamentally suspect.64  The Court explained that the
Constitution prohibits discrimination by federal and state
governments against any citizen because of race.6" Therefore,
55. Id. at 216. The aim of Exclusion Order No. 34 was to prevent espionage
and sabotage. Id. at 216-17.
56. Id. at 218. Approximately five thousand Japanese-Americans refused to
swear allegiance to the United States and several thousand requested return to
Japan. Id. at 219. The Constitution of the United States expressly gives Congress
the power "to declare war ... and make rules concerning captures on land and
water." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 11.
57. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
58. Id. The Court explained that in times of pressing public necessity, racial
restrictions may be imposed due to national safety. Id.
59. Id.
60. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
61. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498. A class action suit was brought by minor Afri-
can-American plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of segregation in the District
of Columbia public schools. Id. The plaintiffs had been refused admission to a public
school in the District of Columbia because of their race. Id. The District of Columbia
is governed by the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, which
governs the states. Id. at 499.
62. Id. at 500.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 499.
65. Id. (citing Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) and Steele v. Louis-
Vol. 34:403
1996 Recent Decisions 411
the Court concluded, in order for the federal government to
restrict the conduct of an individual because of race, it must
show a "proper governmental objective."" The Court found that
segregation in public schools does not satisfy any proper or
reasonable governmental objective and is therefore
unconstitutional. 7
In Loving v. Virginia," the issue before the Court was
whether a state law which prevented marriages between persons
solely because of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In Loving, a Caucasian man and
an African-American woman married in violation of a Virginia
antimiscegenation statute.70 The Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional because it deprived persons of their
constitutional right to due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment.7" The Court reasoned that the
Equal Protection Clause requires that racial classifications be
analyzed using a strict scrutiny standard.72 Therefore, the
Court concluded that in order for a racial classification to be
constitutional, it must be established that some proper state
goal is to be achieved notwithstanding the racial
ville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)).
66. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500. The Court explained that segregation in pub-
lic education imposes a burden on African-American children-an arbitrary depriva-
tion of their liberty-and thus a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 500.
67. Id. at 500.
68. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of
the Virginia Code, which stated:
Leaving State to evade law. If any white person and colored person shall -go
out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of
returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59,
and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solem-
nized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall
be evidence of their marriage.
Id.
Section 20-59 of the Virginia Code provided: "Punishment for marriage. If
any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry
with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confine-
ment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years." Id.
70. Id. The couple travelled to the District of Columbia and were married. Id.
at 3. The couple then returned to Virginia and lived as husband and wife. Id. A few
months after returning to Virginia the couple was indicted for violation of the Vir-
ginia antimiscegenation statute. Id. at 2-3. Miscegenation is defined as a mixture of
races. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (6th ed. 1990).
71. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The Court stated: "Marriage is one of the basic
civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. (citing Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
72. Id. at 11 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 216 (1944)).
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discrimination.73
In Board of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,7
the Court was confronted with the issue of whether a special
minority admissions program at the University of California-
Davis Medical School (the "Davis Program") violated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Court held that the Davis
Program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
ordered the University of California-Davis (the "University") to
admit Bakke.7" The Court, applying strict scrutiny as the
judicial standard of review, concluded that racial or ethnic
classifications of any sort are inherently suspect.77 In a
plurality opinion, Justice Powell explained that the Davis
Program conflicted with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because Bakke was not allowed to
compete for any of the sixteen seats reserved for minorities due
to his race."8 Furthermore, Justice Powell asserted that the
University had not established that the Davis Program was
necessary to accomplish a "compelling state interest" and
therefore could not survive the strict scrutiny standard.79
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,s° the Court addressed the issue of
whether a provision of a congressional statute, which requires at
least ten percent of federal public funds granted for local public
works projects be used to procure services or supplies from
73. Id. The Court found that Virginia had no proper goal that justified the
state law. Id. at 11-12.
74. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
75. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 282-300. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988))
provides as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under a program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance." Id. at 284.
76. Id. at 320. Alan Bakke, a Caucasian applicant, had been rejected twice by
the University. Id. at 276-77.
77. Id. at 305.
78. Id. at 298. Under the Davis Program, 84 seats were open for competition
by all applicants, minority or non-minority. Id. at 289. The remaining 16 seats were
reserved for minority applicants only. Id.
79. Id. at 309-10. The University failed to show that by its own actions it had
discriminated against an actual victim in the past. Id. at 307-10. Therefore, it was
not remedying its own prior discriminatory practice. Id. at 317-18. Justice Powell
reasoned that the Davis Program was too broad to pass constitutional muster and,
therefore, Bakke had been wrongfully denied admission. Id. at 319-20. Justice Powell
asserted that Bakke could not be burdened with redressing group grievances (dis-
crimination) that were no fault of his own. Id. at 298.
80. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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minority business enterprises ("MBE's"), is constitutional under
the Fifth Amendment.81 The Court held that the statute is
constitutional. 2 Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion of
the Court, reasoned that the MBE provision could be
constitutional under either the strict scrutiny standard or the
intermediate scrutiny standard." However, the Court explained
that deference should be given to Congress when legislation is
enacted to remedy past discrimination, and a reviewing court
should apply a more lenient standard of review other than strict
scrutiny." Finally, the Court maintained that the MBE
provision passed constitutional muster because it is narrowly
tailored, limited in scope and was enacted as a strictly remedial
measure.
8 5
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,6 the Supreme
Court considered whether a school board's adoption of race-
based preferences for determination of teacher layoffs violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.87 The Court, in a plurality opinion,
81. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453. The petitioners in Fullilove were several associ-
ations of construction contractors and subcontractors who alleged that they were
being injured economically by the enforcement of the ten percent MBE requirement.
Id. at 455. The Minority Business Enterprise provision of the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall
be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant
gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of
the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises.
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1988)).
82. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
83. Id. at 492. The Chief Justice explained that the Court did not adopt either
standard explicitly but instead established the following test: "Any preference based
on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to
make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees." Id. at 491.
84. Id. at 519. The Court explained: "MWfe accorded great weight to the deci-
sions of Congress" even though the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at 519-20 (citing Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)). The rule is not
different when a congressional program raises equal protection concerns. Id.
85. Id. at 489.
86. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
87. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-73. In 1972, the Jackson Board of Education (the
"Board") added a layoff provision to the collective bargaining agreement it had with
its teachers. Id. at 270. The Board reasoned that the provision was "necessary be-
cause of the racial tension in the community which had extended to its schools." Id.
The layoff provision stated:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniori-
ty in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a
greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage
of minority personnel employed at the time of layoff. In no event will the
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the number of positions
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held that preferential protection from layoffs because of race
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.88 The Court explained that in order for minorities
to be advantaged by racial classifications, a state must
demonstrate a compelling purpose and the purpose must be
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal.89 Additionally, the Court
reasoned that societal discrimination alone is not enough to
justify racial classifications. ° Rather, the Court explained that
there must be some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit." Thus, the Court employed the strict
scrutiny standard and held that the layoff clause violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 3  the Court
addressed the issue of whether a city's requirement that prime
contractors subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract
dollar amount to MBE's violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The Court, applying the strict
scrutiny standard, held that the City of Richmond's minority
preference program failed to make specific findings as to past
discrimination and was therefore unconstitutional." The Court
to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order
for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance.
Id. at 270-71. Caucasian school teachers challenged the constitutionality of the layoff
provision in the contract, alleging that it gave preferential protection to minority
employees. Id. at 271.
88. Id. at 284.
89. Id. at 280. The layoff provision could not be justified by the Board's desire
to provide minority role models for students. Id. at 276.
90. Id. at 276. The Court opined that without particularized findings a court
could allow race-based remedies that are "ageless in their reach into the past and
timeless in their ability to affect the future." Id.
91. Id. at 277.
92. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84. The Court, in support of its judgment, assert-
ed that: "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification." Id. at 280 (citing Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
93. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78. A Caucasian prime contractor claimed that the
MBE program violated its right to equal protection under the law. Id. at 485. The
contractor had submitted the only bid to the City of Richmond for the installation of
plumbing fixtures in the city jail. Id. at 482. The contractor was unable to obtain an
MBE subcontractor for the bid and requested that the City waive its 30 percent set
aside requirement. Id. The City refused and the contractor brought suit. Id. at 483.
The Richmond City Code, § 12-156(a) (1985), defined an MBE as "a business at least
fifty-one percent of which is owned and controlled . . . by minority group members.
Minority group members . . . [are] citizens of the United States who are Blacks,
Spanish speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." Id. at 478.
95. Id. at 499-500. The Court maintained that the standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause does not depend on whether a race is burdened or ben-
efitted by a racial classification and that strict scrutiny must be applied to state or
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reasoned that the City of Richmond failed to consider the use of
race-neutral means to increase MBE participation in city
contracts and the program was not narrowly tailored to meet
any specific goal." The Court concluded by noting that the City
of Richmond had not demonstrated "a strong basis in evidence"
for its decision'that race-based action was necessary. 7
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,9" the Court addressed
the issue of whether Federal Communications Commission (the
"FCC") minority ownership policies violate the Fifth
Amendment.9  The majority of the Court, applying an
intermediate scrutiny standard, held that FCC minority
ownership policies are constitutional if they serve the important
governmental purpose of attaining broadcast diversity and are
significantly related to achievement of that goal."' The Court
explained that deference should be given to Congress' judgment
in light of its institutional competence as a national
legislature.' Additionally, the Court reasoned that the FCC
local public minority preference programs. Id. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment)).
96. Id. at 507-08.
97. Id. at 510. The Court stated that: "[U]nder Richmond's scheme, a success-
ful Black, Hispanic, or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in the country enjoys
an absolute preference over other citizens based solely on their race." Id. at 508.
Additionally, the Court explained that there was no evidence of past discrimination
against Hispanics, Eskimos, Orientals or Aleuts in any part of the Richmond con-
struction industry. Id. at 506. The Court openly displayed the ridiculousness of
Richmond's inclusion of Eskimos in the ordinance when it stated:
It may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen. The
random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never have
suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests
that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.
Id.
98. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
99. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552. Metro Broadcasting was a consolida-
tion of two cases. Id. Two broadcasting companies filed suit alleging that the FCC
policies violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. The broadcasting companies claimed that
the FCC policies give preference to minority broadcasting companies in obtaining
new licenses and acquiring existing television and radio stations and that the poli-
cies violate the equal protection provision of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 558-63.
One policy awards preference for minority ownership and participation in manage-
ment when the FCC considered licensing for new radio or television stations. Id. at
556-57. The other policy allows a broadcaster to avoid FCC sanctions if the broad-
caster transferred ownership to a minority enterprise. Id. at 557.
100. Id. at 600.
101. Id. at 563 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). The Court
asserted that race-conscious programs that are mandated by Congress, even if those
programs are not designed to compensate victims of past societal or governmental
discrimination, are constitutional if they serve important governmental interests and
they are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id.
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minority ownership policies sought to achieve a diversification of
ownership that would lead to a broadened range of programming
available to the public.0 2 Therefore, the Court concluded that
intermediate scrutiny provides that such policies are
constitutional to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives and are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.0 3
The Supreme Court's ruling in Adarand has established that
the judicial standard of review for racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state or local governments, should be strict
scrutiny.'" Presumably this will create a level playing field
between the federal and state governments when further racial
classification programs are challenged in the courts.
In Korematsu, Bolling, Loving, Bakke, Wygant and Croson, the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny as the standard of review
when passing on the constitutionality of race-based classification
statutes. In Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, the Court applied
the more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny. With the
exception of Korematsu and Bolling, the distinguishing factor
between the cases was whether the racial classification had been
imposed by a state or the federal government." 5 Prior to
Adarand, the Supreme Court had two standards of review for
racial classification cases." 6 If the case involved a federal
statute or federally-sponsored program, the Court would impose
intermediate scrutiny.0 7 However, if the case involved a state
statute or a state-sponsored program the Court applied strict
scrutiny as the judicial standard of review.'
In the past, the Supreme Court accorded deference to
legislation passed by Congress, reasoning that due to its size
and composition, congressional decisions should be given a
lenient review."° The Court elaborated that both Congress'
representative status and the compromising nature of legislation
102. Id. at 568. The Court defined intermediate scrutiny utilizing a two prong
test: 1) classifications must serve important governmental objectives; and 2) classifi-
cations must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id. at
566.
103. Id. at 600. The Court explained that "diversity in broadcasting" is an im-
portant governmental objective which could be achieved through enlarging minority
participation. Id. at 572.
104. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
105. id. at 2107.
106. Croson, 488 U.S. at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519
(Marshall, J., concurring).
108. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
109. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
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were part of the design by the Founding Fathers of this country
to guard against oppression." ° Yet, some members of the
Court disagreed with that proposition. Justice O'Connor, writing
the majority opinion for the Court in Adarand, contended that
whether racial classifications are determined by Congress, a
state or a local governmental unit, the racial classifications
should be held to the highest judicial scrutiny."' In Metro
Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor argued in a dissenting opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, that governments must not allocate benefits or
burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or
ethnicity determines how individuals act or think.1
2
Five years later, the minority dissenters in Metro
Broadcasting comprised the majority in Adarand."' Since the
Court's holding in Metro Broadcasting, four Justices who formed
part of the majority in that case have retired. "4 Hence, the
decision in Adarand should not be a startling event. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy,
joined by Justice Thomas, were able to override the double
standard that had been applied to race classifications for more
than a decade."'
In conclusion, while the Court appears to have leveled the
playing field for the federal and state governments, increased
discretion is now available for courts to determine if racial
classifications can survive a strict scrutiny standard. P r i o r t o
Adarand, a federally mandated racial classification program was
subjected to an intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial
review. In order to be valid, the program only had to serve
important governmental interests and be substantially related to
those governmental interests. Following Adarand, courts are
required to determine if a federally mandated racial
classification program is narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination that has been proven to have occurred and that
the government has a compelling interest in that program.
The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand proclaimed that all
Americans are entitled to equal treatment under the law,
regardless of their race. The color of one's skin should not be of
110. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490-91.
111. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105-11.
112. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
114. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens formed the majority. Id.
115. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
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interest to the United States Government.
Yet, there is no doubt that racial discrimination still exists
today. Accordingly, it must be understood that special programs
may sometimes be necessary to remedy blatant racial
discrimination. But the question that remains after Adarand is
whether the federal government, in trying to remedy
discrimination through special programs, can design programs
that a court will find to be narrowly tailored and specific enough
to achieve a compelling interest. In the end, only future court
decisions will indicate whether such programs can in fact
survive when reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Julie A. Ellis
